Trafficking in Trademarks: Setting Boundaries for the Uneasy Relationship Between AProperty@ Rights and Trademark and Publicity Rights by Sheldon W. Halpern * Introduction: Trademarks and Intellectual Property Trademark law isn=t fun anymore. Until quite recently, trademark law was something of a refreshing outlier in the overheated world of intellectual property theory. Most observers 1 did not become exercised over the social implications or cultural consequences of trademark law; after all, it was just about money and about who was in the best position to profit from the exploitation of certain words, phrases, pictures and the like in connection with the sale of goods or services. Unlike copyright, which is predicated on at least a modicum of creativity, and unlike the novelty-centered field of patent law, trademark, a kind of hybrid afterthought, is a marketing construct, whose justification cannot be found in the improvement of culture or society. As I=ve suggested elsewhere, while affecting the pocket, trademark problems generally do not touch the soul of society. 2 The result was that one could simply enjoy the sometimes interesting, sometimes foolish, sometimes creative, and sometimes just plain silly problems presented in trademark litigation. For the teacher and for the student, if not for the practitioner, it was, really, just fun. The continuing efforts of the Mattel corporation to protect the virtue and reputation of Barbie, 3 for example, while producing interesting legal analysis, also produces chuckles.
For good or ill, these carefree days are fast fading into the past. Commentators (including me) point to the explosive growth of trademark law. 4 Modern trademark law, born in the 1946 Lanham Act 5 as a federal remedial device for enforcing common law Aunfair competition@ claims, 6 has, with help from its judicial midwives, 7 spread and expanded much like kudzu; it has transformed, or morphed, from Aa simple subset of the law of unfair competition to a multifaceted remedial scheme,@ 8 and Atrademark theory@ has become a popular source of legal scholarship. 9
As the Supreme Court sees it, 10 the principal function of Aclassic@ trademark law had been the protection of the consuming public from being defrauded by one person=s use of another=s trademarkCand thus the centrality of the issue of the likelihood of the consuming public being Aconfused@ as to the source or origin of the goods or services to which the trademark related. 11 It has been argued that a more accurate, historical justification for trademark law focuses on the producer, rather than the consumer of the goods, and is directed toward preventing the diversion of trade by means of unauthorized use of one producer=s trademark by another, competing producer 12 Cand thus the centrality of locating trademark law as a subset of the broader law of unfair competition. In either case, the relationship of trademark law to the fundamental structure of A intellectual property@ law is, at best, tenuous and incidental. Neither of these teleological constructs involves matters of originality, creativity, or novelty, the indicia of intellectual activity underlying intellectual property. Only at the simplest level of abstractionCthe intangible nature of trademark rightsCdo we find commonality supporting the joinder of copyright, patent, and trademark. But joined they are, however mismatched, and Atrademark@ necessarily is part of the triumvirate of basic intellectual property constructs. We therefore must ultimately deal with the Aproperty@ aspects of trademark rights, a not unusual situation in the law as application of a label requires us to rationalize that label. Accordingly, we find theoretical discussion of the function of trademark law often framed in Chicago-school law and economics terms as an instrument of consumer efficiency; a means of limiting transaction costs, as the trademark, in serving as a shorthand descriptor of the source and quality of goods and services eliminates the need for deeper consumer investigation in making purchasing decisions. 13 As the Supreme Court observed: [Trademark law,] by preventing competitors from copying Aa source-identifying mark,@ A reduce[s] the customer=s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,@ and Ahelps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.@ 14
So long as trademark disputes were limited to those between competing offerors of goods and services, the debate over whether trademark law is to be considered consumer-centered or producer-centered, 15 while interesting, did not carry serious consequences. Similarly, in the context of disputes limited to business competitors, it doesn=t terribly much matter whether one considersAuse@ or Aconfusion@ the linchpin of trademark law, 16 as both of those factors will inevitably be part of a determination of liability. So, too, within that limited context, it did not terribly much matter how one rationalized the Aproperty@ nature of trademark rights. The problem, of course, is that modern trademark disputes, particularly those that have arisen since the advent of the Internet, are not limited to the traditional Aunfair competition@ context.
Whether the differences are in degree or in kind, the internet provided a challenge to traditional trademark constructs. At the simplest level, the internet could be viewed as one of a variety of media, so that the trademark related questions arising from use by one of another=s mark in connection with the offering of goods or services on an internet website could be dealt with as a Aclassic@ infringement situation, in which the specific medium is irrelevant and the dispute would be determined by application of traditional trademark principles. Thus, a website offering jewelry while prominently displaying the classic Tiffany color, would be vulnerable to a trademark infringement claim from Tiffany; in considering such a claim, the fact that the use of the mark occurred in the context of a website rather than a print advertisement would be immaterial, and the dispute would be determined by considering the strength and validity of the Tiffany color as a mark and the likelihood of consumer confusion. Similarly, if the Tiffany color were used to draw the web-surfer further into the site, where confusion might be dissipated, the Ainitial interest confusion@ problem 17 could be assessed without significant reference to the internet as the medium.
But the internet as a medium has provided the setting for unorthodox, or at least unanticipated uses of trademarks in ways quite different from those underlying traditional infringement claims. For example, both Dogan & Lemley and Dinwoodie & Janis, with their conflicting approaches, provide examples of the kinds of issues presented in this untraditional context (such as the use of meta-tags and embedded matter in search engines and an expansive approach to what is Ainitial interest confusion@). 18 This in turn has given rise to complex questions of the nature of trademark law as a remedial device.
The response to the peculiarly internet-based problems created by internet domain names that are identical with or confusingly similar to trademarks is particularly interesting. The advent of Acybersquatting,@ the registration as a domain name of another=s trademark (e.g., cocacola.com), created a challenge to traditional trademark constructs that, after a period of confusion, was met by sui generic legislation. The paradigmatic case of cybersquatting involved registration of a theretofore unregistered domain name for the express purpose of pressuring the trademark owner to buy the name from the registrant. 19 In this situation, and variants, the courts were faced initially with trying to fit the registrant=s use of another=s mark into the framework of Ause,@ Ause in commerce@ and A likelihood of confusion,@ producing strained and unsatisfying (legally, if not morally) results; a brief attempt was made, after enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 20 to fit the cybersquatting scenario into the somewhat more hospitable Adilution@ environment. Again, it was clear that the shapes of the pegs and the holes were significantly different and the matter was essentially settled by special purpose legislation 21 and a more robust internet practice. 22 In short, it became apparent that the problems were not, at their root, Atrademark@ problems, but something qualitatively different, to be dealt with by means of other, albeit special purpose, constructs.
Although the Asolution@ to theses essentially non-trademark internet-based problems appears to have been found in sui generis legislation, it is instructive that the initial attempt to deal with them was by a protean application of trademark constructs, It was enticing to use these constructs, as the issues arose in the context of continually broadening trademark protection,both with respect to marks registered under the Lanham Act and to marks for which protection is sought as unregistered marks under section 43(a) of the Act. 23 The response to these developments was a renewed focus on the nature of trademark itself, driven by concern that the law had moved radically from recognition of a simple subset of the law of unfair competition, a limited Aright appurtenant@ to the sale of goods or services, 24 to recognition of some form of standalone instrument, embodying a property-like interest akin to copyright or similar interests having an independent value. Whether from a property perspective, a consumer perspective, or a producer perspective, and whether one focuses on Ause@ or on A confusion,@ there is consensus that Amodern trademark law differs fundamentally from its traditional counterpart in its understanding of what a trademark does and how it adds value.@ 25
What is left unsaid, even with this consensus, is how we are to define, quantify and to what extent, if at all, protect, that Avalue.@ In short, what boundaries are to be set for this redefined concept? Much as with related concerns over the Acommodification@ of personality that has colored (if not distorted) debate over the analogous right of publicity, 26 discussion of whether a trademark is or is not a form of Aproperty@ and whether A propertization@ 27 of trademarks is a bad thing for the well-being of society, 28 is interesting and important to the formulation of policy; they however do not move us forward significantly in the necessary search for meaningful boundaries in defining trademark rights as such. The reality is that the trademark owners, the branding enterprises, will inevitably seek to expand the strength, power and scope of trademarks. At the core of these opinionsCdecided not long after the Court had signaled an expansive approach to trademark law 36 C is the Court=s clear concern with constitutional balance, a determination that trademark law, whatever its underpinnings, not be used in a manner that can subvert the constitutionally limited monopolies of copyright and patent law and the scope of permissible public use. Thus, the Wal-Mart and TrafFix opinions do not simply place serious limits on the use of trademark law to protect product design; 37 they also, by implication in Wal-Mart and more directly in TrafFix, attempt to inhibit the prospect of trademark law impinging on the boundaries and limitations of patent law:
[I]n Wal-Mart ... we were careful to caution against misuse or over-extension of trade dress. We noted that Aproduct design almost invariably serves purposes other than source identification.@ Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products. In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying. As the Court has explained, copying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive economy. Notwithstanding the preemption context of these opinions, TrafFix and, in more explicit detail, Dastar used them as a springboard for delineating firmer boundaries, if not higher walls, to contain and inhibit an expansive trademark jurisprudence. Where TrafFix was concerned with preventing trademark constructs from crossing the boundaries of patent law, the Dastar Court acted to ensure that trademark law (in the form of Lanham Act ' 43(a)) not trespass upon the limiting principles of copyright law. The concern over these boundaries is not predicated on some form of logical purity; rather it arises from the different constitutional bases for the exercise of congressional power with respect to patents and copyrights, on the one hand, and trademark on the other. While Congress is given explicit power, under article 1 section 8 of the Constitution, to act with respect to copyright and patent, congressional power with respect to trademarks is not express but rather is inferred from the general power of Congress to act with respect to interstate and foreign commerce. 48 Both the express grant of power as to copyright and patent and the constitutional temporal limitation on that power 49 contemplate a vigorous and complementary public domain, a constantly growing area in which the public is free to copy those works which either do not qualify for copyright or patent protection or whose protection has expired; conversely, trademark rights, which derive from the use Ain commerce@ of a mark that is distinctive in identifying the source or origin of goods or services, will endure, even perpetually, so long as they remain so distinctive. To the extent that trademark rights might serve to expand or extend copyright or patent rights, the complementary constitutional balance is seriously impaired. As the Court said in
Dastar:
The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has expired, like Athe right to make [an article whose patent has expired]Cincluding the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patentedCpasses to the public. Consistent with this need to recognize and secure the boundaries among trademark, copyright, and patent, the Dastar court held that Aorigin,@ for purposes of the Lanham Act, refers to the source of the physical Agoods,@ and not to the underlying intellectual interests embodied in those goods: In sum, reading the phrase Aorigin of goods@ in the Lanham Act in accordance with the Act=s common-law foundations (which were not designed to protect originality or creativity), and in light of the copyright and patent laws (which were), we conclude that the phrase refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods. ... To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that ' 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do. 51 These opinions, with their strong emphasis on the constitutional and policy distinctions among trademark, copyright, and patent law, and their express desire to honor and recognize these distinctions, provide the basis for balancing and setting boundaries for trademark and related rights. The problem of balance emerges most clearly in considering the trademark implications arising from transactions involving the mark itself, merchandising the trademark. Trafficking in the mark, as the source of value for the consumer, lies at the clearest interface between trademark and Aproperty@ rights. The analysis here gives us the opportunity more clearly to articulate trademark boundaries, while serving as well to create a principled basis for similarly bounding the analogous right of publicity.
AProperty@ Rights: Traffic in the Thing Itself 52
A. Making Law I: ARight You Are If You Think You Are.@
The dress code in law schools being what it is, it is not at all unusual to find students in class wearing baseball caps or sweaters or articles of adornment carrying logos of sports teams or of academic institutions. In my trademark class, I will regularly ask the student wearing a New York Yankees cap (i.e., a cap with the ANY@ monogram on it) whether he or she thought that the vendor who sold the cap did so under a license from the New York Yankees or, if not, whether the New York Yankees should be able to assert a trademark infringement claim against that vendor. Almost invariably, the student, and the vast majority of the class, will argue that, of course, the Yankees (or the Red Sox or Notre Dame University or any of the other entities or institutions whose mark is so displayed) should be able to control the use and marketing of their logo. The students will readily concede that, in buying the hat, the purchaser doesn=t care who made it; nor does the purchaser really believe that the Yankees manufactured it or even were in any way involved in the manufacture. Nevertheless, the students will argue that the unlicensed vendor is wrongfully capitalizing on the purchaser=s desire to show affinity with or loyalty to the team and that the law therefore must be protective of the goodwill embodied in the logo and require a license from the trademark owner. As a general matter, the law is responsive to that kind of concern, as it recognizes, expressly in section 43(a) of the Lanham act with respect to unregistered marks, and by implication with respect to registered marks under section 32, that an infringement action generally may be sustained upon a showing of unauthorized use of a trademark in a manner that creates a likelihood of confusion not only as to the source or origin of goods or services but also as to Aaffiliation, connection or association@ or Asponsorship or approval.@ 53 Therefore, since it is assumed that the law must protect the trademark owner here (whether because of that owner=s efforts, creativity, or otherwise), it is reasonable for consumers to assume that the vendor must have been licensed in order to transact business. 54 That is, the students suggest that, because the public generally believes that the law requires that one who sells an item embodying another=s trademark may do so only with permission, 55 an unauthorized sale will create a likelihood of confusion in the consuming public, if not as to the actual source or origin of the product, then as to sponsorship, permission, approval or authorization. It is in short, a bizarre syllogism: if enough people believe that the law grants trademark owners rights as to certain uses, then the law grants trademark owners rights as to those usesCa strange revisitation of Pirandello=s Right You Are if You Think You Are. 56 Again, the syllogism is not based on a proposition of law arising out of consumer Aconfusion@ as to sponsorship; there is little independent reason to assume such sponsorship absent some external factor, such as an A official@ designation. Rather, the assumption of sponsorship arises out of consumer assumptions as to the state of the law! 57 As one commentator put it: In this system, rights are bounded only by consumer understanding: If consumers believe the Yankees logo on a hat suggests the Yankees endorsed the maker of the hat, then the Yankees have the right to control that use. And the available evidence suggests that consumers believe names and creative content, some of which can be protected as trademarks, are subject to substantial control. Assuming consumer beliefs about the use of marks or logos on merchandise even roughly approximates this evidence, modern law has essentially no choice but to respond. 58
But is Amodern law@ really without choice here? Certainly, as a general matter, consumer belief as to what a mark signifies is a central part of trademark law; the ubiquity of consumer survey evidence in trademark litigation demonstrates the importance of determining consumer reaction to a mark; but not, however, consumer understanding of the law. What the Aconsumers believe@ in the context of merchandising of the mark itself is not some consensus as to the reality of commercial behavior; it is not the same kind of Abelief@ that informs the question of whether a mark has obtained secondary meaning, or whether there may be consumer confusion as to the source of a product. Rather than consumer belief, what we have here is something more elliptical and self-referential, consumer assumption (or misapprehension) as to what the law requires, giving rise to a A belief@ as to what must have happened, which in turn gives rise to a legal construct that then conforms to that assumption! The difficulty with the liability scenario is not that liability is predicated on likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship or endorsement, but rather that the perceived need for authorization, for sponsorship or endorsement, arises from the consumers= assumption about the law itself and the perceived consequently unlawful nature of the activity. 59 In short, if a Amerchandising@ right is to be recognized under these circumstances, then, realistically, such recognition cannot be predicated on the Afact@ of consumer confusion as to origin or sponsorship of the objects of sale.
To a fair extent, the underlying consumer assumption about the state of the law seems to reflect the coupling of the existence of a lucrative market with an uncritical aversion to A free riding.@ Certainly, merchandising of the trademark itself is a large, highly profitable business. 60 Quite apart from the ubiquitous market in professional sports related materials, licensing of collegiate trademarks has exploded to the point that these marks have become substantial assets of the educational institutions. 61 There is no question that, in terms of marketplace reality, there is serious Avalue@ in certain trademarks. That perceived value, in turn, causes the students, in my example, to characterize the unlicensed vendor of the cap as opportunistically capitalizing on or exploiting someone else=s efforts (i.e., the matrix of associations, positive and negative, conjured up by the Yankees logo) and assume that such conduct cannot be lawful. The fact of Avalue,@ and the possibility of its opportunistic exploitation, does not, however, automatically translate into creation of an independent right.
AFree riding@ is a relativistic concept, without a real moral core. As Justice Kennedy observed in TrafFix, Acopying is not always discouraged or disfavored.@ 62 While the term is normally used pejoratively in referring to the unauthorized appropriation of someone else=s goodwill, the courts have made it clear that the Afree rider@ is not necessarily an evildoer. Absent special and exceptional circumstances, plagiarism, in the sense only of the taking of another=s ideas, generally is not actionable. 63 Nor, of course, is copying of matter in the public domain. Similarly, one who duplicates precisely the otherwise unprotected scent of, let us say, Chanel No. 5 perfume, and sells the resulting product, correctly labeled and accurately advertised as identical to the scent of Chanel No. 5, is certainly Afree riding,@ but has not violated trademark or any other rights of the competitor, even while Aexploiting@ the Chanel mark in so doing: 64 Disapproval of the copyist=s opportunism may be an understandable first reaction, ~but this initial response to the problem has been curbed in deference to the greater public good.~... By taking his ~free ride,~ the copyist, albeit unintentionally, serves an important public interest by offering comparable goods at lower prices. On the other hand, the trademark owner, perhaps equally without design, sacrifices public to personal interests by seeking immunity from the rigors of competition. 65
If one eliminates the opprobrium from Afree riding,@ 66 then the shaky edifice supporting the application of trademark law to merchandising of the mark itself, built on an ephemeral assumption of what the law is, starts to collapse. In short, I would suggest that the assumption that the law requires consent of the trademark owner to merchandising of the mark itself, flows from Adisapproval of the copyist=s opportunism,@ rather than from a factual understanding of the world of merchandise licensing. Perhaps clarity can come from a re-framing, without the moral opprobrium: one who buys a logo-bearing item (a cap or mug or t-shirt, that is bought in order to show loyalty or affinity to the mark owner) from a vendor displaying an Aofficial@ sign, affirmatively stating sponsorship or affiliation between the vendor and the mark owner, may justifiably believe that such affiliation exists, so that the vendor who falsely makes such a statement would clearly be creating a likelihood of confusion as to Asponsorship.@ 67 On the other hand, if the consuming public were to believe that the law does not require a vendor selling such items to procure the consent of the trademark owner, then an unlicensed vendor, who does not make an affirmative statement of Aofficial@ sponsorship or affiliation, would not be creating a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship. 87 argue strongly against recognition of a merchandising right (an argument epitomized by their related argument against recognition of the trademark owner=s claims where the mark is not being used on unrelated goods but is used on A knock-offs@ of the trademark owner=s products under circumstances in which the consumer is quite aware of the counterfeit nature of the seller=s activities). Nevertheless, in a significant sense, this policy debate, however interesting, has limited utility in the context of trademark law. That is, while the merchandising question usually involves use, in the form of direct trafficking, of a trademark, if there is to be, however limited or circumscribed, recognition of this kind of right, that recognition needs to have a more substantial basis than interpretation of trademark principles. In short, much as with the problem of attempting to fit the cybersquatting and related problems into a Atrademark@ framework, we must ultimately recognize that, however we collectively may resolve the policy question, such resolution must be done outside the parameters of trademark law.
Once the circular nature of the Asponsorship confusion@ is understood, then the trademark underpinnings for recognition of a merchandising right disappears 88 ; that is, the A merchandising@ issue is outside the necessary boundaries of trademark law and if any stand-alone rights are to be recognized, that recognition must be sui generis; outside of the Atrademark@ monopoly, some tertium quid. 89
C. Making Law III; The Analogous Problem of the Right of Publicity 1. Context: The Nature of the Right of Publicity
The Amerchandising right@ issue has its analog at the state levelCstatutory and common-lawCin the right of publicity and in the struggle of the courts to find appropriate boundaries for that troublesome and confusing construct. It is generally understood that that which we call the right of publicity began with a brief 1953Second Circuit opinion 90 by Judge Jerome Frank (one of the founders of the legal realist movement) holding that a celebrity 91 has a right to damages and other relief for the unauthorized commercial appropriation of the celebrity=s persona and that such a right is independent of a common-law or a statutory right of privacy. 92 By 1953, the courts and the legislatures of the various states had come to recognize a Aright of privacy,@ in the sense of a personal, subjective interest in anonymity. One who appropriates the commercial value of a person=s identity by using without consent the person=s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for [monetary and injunctive] relief. 100 The historical development of the right of publicity, its relation to the right of privacy, its emergence as an independent right, and the maturation and general recognition of that right have been fully described elsewhere. 101 This now fully mature state-based right is recognized generally either by specific statute or by state common law as protecting the economic interest in an individual=s persona. As noted above, for practical purposes, the right is celebrity based: for good or ill, the phenomenon of celebrity generates commercial value. As opposed to that of the Aprivate@ person, the celebrity=s persona carries with it what has been termed an associative value, 102 the perceived ability to confer value on that which might be associated with the celebrity; i.e., the right of publicity Adoes not protect one=s name per se; rather, it protects the value associated with that name.@ 103
We accept, as a matter of course, that celebrity will frequently carry with it a marketable component separate from those activities which initially produced the status itself. Thus, for example, there is a difference between the value that a successful golf professional such as Tiger Williams gives to an instructional video about golf and the merchandising value that use of his name imparts to a line of T-shirts. It is that latter iteration of the economic value of a persona that informs the right of publicity. However socially useful or detrimental this marketing attribute of celebrity may be, [i]t would be difficult for any court ... to be unaware of the manner in which celebrities exploit the public=s recognition of their name and image. ... There are few every day activities that have not been touched by celebrity merchandising. ... These endorsements are of great economic value to celebrities and are now economic reality.@ 104
The issue of Avalue,@ as the Ninth Circuit has observed, is not a function of merit or desert; rather, it is simply a matter of market place reality: Television and other media create marketable celebrity identity value. Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended by those who have achieved celebrity value to exploit it for profit. The law protects the celebrity=s sole right to exploit this value whether the celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a combination thereof. 105 Of course, as discussed supra, the simple assertion of economic reality, understanding that something has value, does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the law must protect that value. The emergence and maturation of the right of publicity reflects an American societal determination, through the courts and the legislatures, that the individual=s interest in the associative value of his or her persona merits legal protection. When the court observes, as above, that Athe law protects@ the interest, it articulates the policy determination made by the courts and various state legislatures to provide that legal recognition. (That determination is by no means universal, as jurisdictions outside of the United States continue to struggle with the fundamental policy determination whether that market place reality justifies legal recognition of the interest; suffice it to say that the American model has become increasingly popular. 106 )
The Right of Publicity and Trademark
The economic reality of a marketable associative value of the personae of some people both distinguishes the right of publicity from privacy rights and establishes its kinship with trademark rights. In essence, as discussed infra, both are forms of Aappurtenant@ rights. It is not a mere coincidence that recognition of the independent nature of the right of publicity is found in the American Law Institute=s Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition, displacing its earlier home in the Restatement of Torts. So too, it is not mere coincidence that as the right of publicity has matured, it has been increasingly connected to trademark rights. As a matter of practice, it is quite common to couple allegations of violation of the right of publicity with claims for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, either as registered marks (when the plaintiff=s name has in fact been registered), or as unregistered marks under section 43(a). 107 Although A as a general rule, a person=s image or likeness cannot function as a trademark,[c]ourts have recognized false endorsement claims under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act where a celebrity=s image or persona is used in association with a product so as to imply that the celebrity endorses the product.@ 108 To a fair extent, this use of Section 43(a) creates a federal variant of the state law right of publicity claim. 109
The federal variant is, to be sure, not a true analogue. For the Section 43(a) claim, as with any trademark claim, the allegedly wrongful use must create a Alikelihood of confusion@ with respect to the source, origin, or endorsement or sponsorship of goods or services. In the classic right of publicity situation, the appropriation of the associative value of the persona would normally give rise at least to confusion as to Aendorsement@ of the user=s goods or services. 110 But such Aendorsement@ confusion, while often present, is not essential to the publicity claim, if one can otherwise demonstrate that the value of the persona has been associated with the offending product. AAlthough publicity rights are related to laws preventing false endorsement, they offer substantially broader protection.@ 111 In any event, the kinship between the federal trademark construct and the widely recognized state law right is evident and the experience with each may usefully inform the process of creating appropriate boundaries for each.
The Boundaries Inherent in the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity involves a communicative tort; it necessarily implicates speech and therefore raises First Amendment concerns. The interconnection between publicity rights and First Amendment rights to free expression has caused a fair amount of judicial anguish and accompanying complexity in dealing what would otherwise seem to be a rather simple issue. As the comments to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition note, A[t]he right of publicity as recognized by statute and common law is fundamentally constrained by the public and constitutional interest in freedom of expression.@ 112 This constraint is part of the very nature of the right, however, as any claim must be based on the commercial appropriation of identity; news, information, even entertainment uses, by the very definition of the right, 113 are outside its scope. Thus, while using a celebrity as the subject of a book, or a play, or magazine or newspaper articles, usually involves a measure of gain for the author or publisher, such entertainment or newsworthy uses are beyond the reach of the right of publicity. 114 The broad Anewsworthiness@ shelter 115 that insulates many uses of an individual=s identity from right of privacy claims 116 is no less applicable to the right of publicity, 117 and has been the means by which the courts have consistently defined the ambit of constitutionally protected dissemination of ideas. 118 As the Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition makes clear, the right of publicity does not ordinarily extend to Athe use of a person=s identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, or in works of fiction or nonfiction or in advertising that is incidental to such uses.@ 119 As I have suggested elsewhere: The right of publicity does not reach beyond the interest it is designed to protect, i.e. , the associative value, the hard economic commercial value of an individual's identity, and thus is limited to commercial exploitative uses. It is this exploitative appropriation of a property interest, and not simply a formulaic approach to commercial speech, that precludes First Amendment protection for the appropriator. As a result, for the most part, First Amendment policy considerations have little impact on the avowedly commercial appropriation of identity, the classic right of publicity case. 120 In short, despite some judicial indulgence in a kind of deconstructive critique of the right itself, 121 as properly understood, the right of publicity is not inconsistent with newsworthy, entertainment, critical, satirical, or parodic uses. 122 A television program that simply provides information about an athlete=s achievements would not implicate the right of publicity, 123 whereas such implication would arise from a television advertisement that uses that information about an athlete to call attention to and to frame the advertiser=s commercial advertising; the liability arises not simply from the mere fact of using the athlete=s name, but in doing so in a manner that associates the athlete with the product. 124 Despite the occasional commentary viewing the right of publicity with alarm, 125 except perhaps at the margins, the right easily coexists with the First Amendment. Even at the margins, as with related trademark issues, the courts have been quite ready to recognize and address appropriate First Amendment concerns. As the Second Circuit observed in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 126 involving both trademark and right of publicity claims arising out of the use of a well-known actress= name in the title of a motion picture: Because overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on
First Amendment values, we must construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a conflict. ... We believe that in general the Act should be construed to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression. 127
So too, a sophisticated, nuanced approach, predicated on an understanding of the associative, appurtenant nature of the right of publicity can obviate apparent problems. For example, in Rogers, Judge Newman observed that the use of the name of the actress Ginger Rogers in the phrase AFred and Ginger,@ as part of the title of a motion picture about the travails of an Italian dance team, was not an appropriation of her name, or exploitation of the value of her name. Rather, her Aname@ was used in an iconic sense, a kind of shorthand in which the phrase AFred and Ginger@ did not refer so much to the specific people (Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers) as it did to the form of elegant ballroom dancing that they had come to represent. 128 That is, some aspect of a celebrity may transcend his or her own persona and become evocative of a more general, if not generic concept involving use of language rather than use of persona. The inappropriateness of the right of publicity in such a situation is self-evident. Although much may be said in favor of categorical rules under appropriate circumstances, 129 in dealing with the interface between language and persona, the idea of Aname@ is much too flexible to give rise to a categorical rule supplanting analysis. 130
The scope of a rule is often ... limited by its rationale. Or, to make the same point differently, one way of going astray in legal analysis is to focus on the semantics of a rule rather than its purpose. 131 To Shakespeare=s question, Awhat=s in a name?,@ the lawyer looking at a trademark of publicity claim might well respond Ait depends on the circumstances.@ Such a circumstantial analysis (applied to the image evoked by Vanna White) might well have been used to avoid the controversial result in the Ninth Circuit=s White v. Samsung opinion. 132 A nuanced analysis of publicity claims would recognize that use of a name or image or other indicia of persona does not per se implicate the right of publicity, that a contextual analysis of the use is necessary in order to determine if there has been an appropriation of the associative value of the persona. That analytic model, rather than a categorical conclusion, provides one of the requisite boundaries that allows a robust right of publicity to exist easily with free expression. We should consider merchandising and the right of publicity within the context of these boundaries, just as we must consider merchandising and trademark rights within the context of the proper boundaries of trademark law.
Publicity and AMerchandising Rights:
Perhaps the most interesting boundary, albeit one that seems counterintuitive, concerns a kind of Amerchandising@ right, analogous to the attempt to create independent rights in a trademark itself (discussed supra). Briefly, I believe that the right of publicity, if fully understood as an appurtenant, associative right, is inapplicable to commercial use of the persona itself independent of an association with another person or another=s goods or services. In short, just as a trademark, per se, is not an independent form of property and trademark law, as properly understood, should not be construed to embrace a separate merchandising right in a trademark, the right of publicity, that associative economic construct, is not an independent form of property in persona and therefore it similarly should not be construed to embrace an independent merchandising right.
Before the right of publicity emerged from its privacy moorings, and was simply, and erroneously, considered the Aappropriation branch@ of the right of privacy, it was assumed that, just as with the right of privacy, any trafficking in anyone=s image for commercial purposes gave rise to a claim (within the statutory or common law limitations). 133 In the context of the right of privacy, a clearly commercial public dissemination of an individual =s image, without consent, will support a privacy claim by the person pictured. 134 The only serious issue in privacy litigation in those circumstances would be whether the otherwise commercial use could be saved by some reasonable tie to Anewsworthiness.@ 135 Accordingly, in that privacy context, our concern is solely with the public and commercial dissemination of the imageCassociation with the person disseminating that image or with any goods or services would be irrelevant. Thus, when Time, Inc., as the owner of the well known Eisenstadt photograph, The Kissing Sailor, attempted, many years after the initial (and clearly newsworthy 136 ) publication of the photo, to offer copies of the photo for sale to the public, the court had little difficulty upholding a cause of action by the pictured Asailor@ for violation of his right of privacy. 137
On superficial analysis, it seems quite logical to transfer this privacy-based proposition to the right of publicity. Thus, there was no question, under Georgia law, that if Dr. Martin Luther King=s right of publicity were descendible, his estate would have a claim against one who sold, without consent, statuettes of Dr. King. The Georgia Supreme court, certifying to the federal court, recognized the descendibility and consequently the viability of the cause of action for violation of the late Dr. King=s Aright of publicity.@ 138 Similarly, the estate of Elvis Presley has vigorously pursued right of publicity claims against those purporting to sell Presley photos or memorabilia. 139 More recently, right of publicity claims were brought against the sale of lithographs and T-shirts bearing drawings of the images of the Three Stooges 140 and serigraphs and lithographs of a painting of the professional golfer, Tiger Woods. 141 As discussed below, the courts in these cases assume the applicability of the common law or statutory rights of publicity to the defendants= use of the images The issue in the litigation, rather, was whether the court should construct a complex Afair use@ or first amendment Aexception@ to the right.
In the Three Stooges case (Comedy Central v. Saderup), the California Supreme Court, while ultimately holding for the plaintiff (the assignee of the Stooges= publicity rights) sought to Aresolve a conflict@ between the right of publicity and the first amendment and to Ato develop a test that will unerringly distinguish between forms of artistic expression protected by the First Amendment and those that must give way to the right of publicity.@ 142 It proposed borrowing the Afair use@ construct of Atransformative use@ from the United States Supreme Court=s copyright opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 143 The court found the Campbell inquiry into whether a work is ~transformative~ Ato be necessarily at the heart of any judicial attempt to square the right of publicity with the First Amendment.@ 144 When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain directly trespassing on the right of publicity without adding significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative artist. ... On the other hand, when a work contains significant transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of publicity. ... We ask, in other words, whether a product containing a celebrity=s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant=s own expression rather than the celebrity=s likeness. ... In sum, when an artist is faced with a right of publicity challenge to his or her work, he or she may raise as affirmative defense that the work is protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant transformative elements or that the value of the work does not derive primarily from the celebrity=s fame. 145 Concluding that the defendant=s drawings, however skillful they might be, were simply appropriative of the images without any transformative effects, the court held for the plaintiff. 146
In ETW, the divided Sixth Circuit panel concluded that the painting at issue Ahas substantial informational and creative content which outweighs any adverse effect on ETW=s market and that [the] work does not violate Woods=s right of publicity.@ 147 The court then expressly adopts the Ninth Circuit=s Comedy III Atransformative use@ model and, holding that the defendant=s image of Tiger Woods in the Masters of Augusta painting 148 sold by defendant was sufficiently Atransformative,@ concludes that AWoods=s right of publicity must yield to the First Amendment.@ 149
These judicial approaches to merchandising the persona itself, much like merchandising a trademark itself, are at best needlessly complex and, more seriously, less than helpful in providing a consistent and predictable set of limits on the right of publicity. Thus, while two members of the ETW panel found the painting Atransformative@ and protected, the third vigorously dissented and called for summary judgment for the plaintiff on the right of publicity claim; the dissent, while also adopting the Comedy III framework, found nothing Atransformative@ in the defendant=s work (Ait is difficult to discern any appreciable transformative or creative contribution in Defendant=s prints so as to entitle them to First Amendment protection@). 150
Post hoc determinations of what is Atransformative@ are inherently idiosyncratic. As the California Supreme Court itself points out in Comedy III, the copyright fair use analogy is an imperfect guide for use in analyzing the right of publicity. 151 It is abundantly clear, from the complex, lengthy, and somewhat tortured exercises of the courts in dealing with the problem of marketing the persona itself, that the courts are uncomfortable. The attempt to engraft onto the right of publicity the highly nuanced copyright fair use construct in these circumstances, much as the related application of the copyright Afirst sale@ doctrine to shelter re-sales of a celebrity image, 152 reflects this discomfort; it is a recognition that the right of publicity does not really fit here. We must of course use the best tools available under the circumstances and quite often (as can be the case with categorical rules) predictability and consistency are not necessarily the optimal result. Certainly, the law, and many areas of intellectual property law in particular, must accommodate to uncertainty; living with post-hoc determinations and their consequence of limited predictability is often the optimal approach to some complex problems. 153 But we should choose the path of uncertainty only where there is not a viable and more predictable alternative consistent with the underlying legal principles. It seems to me that with respect to the right of publicity analogue to Amerchandising@ rights, there is such an alternative, predicated on the inherent nature of the right of publicity.
Briefly, a sophisticated understanding of the right of publicity (as distinct from its privacy antecedent) as a right apppurtenant, much like a trademark, whose function is to protect the interest in the economic associative value of a well known persona, leads to the conclusion that the right does not itself extend to exploitation of the persona standing alone. In Comedy III Judge Mosk expressly rejected the suggestion that, for right of publicity liability under the California statutes, the sale of the images themselves, as embodied in lithographs and T-shirts did not amount to the use of the images Aon or in products@ or merchandise, as required by California law; he found instead that Saderup=s lithographic prints of The Three Stooges are themselves tangible personal property, consisting of paper and ink, made as products to be sold and displayed on walls like similar graphic art. Saderup=s T-shirts are likewise tangible personal property, consisting of fabric and ink, made as products to be sold and worn on the body like similar garments. 154
The court here skimmed the surface of the question and could well have pursued it more deeply. The matter is reminiscent of that in the Tenth Circuit=s Giles opinion, 155 with its holding that patches and labels bearing counterfeit trademarks are not Agoods@ for purposes of the criminal statute. 156 If we start with the fundamental construct of associative value 157 on which the right of publicity is predicated, then conceptually that right is not implicated absent circumstances in which the persona is associated with another=s product or service. 158 Indeed, it is that association, the imparting of the economic value of the persona to something else, that lies at the heart of the separation of publicity rights from privacy rights and distinguishes this economic right. We do not need to resolve here the question whether a celebrity, someone who has chosen to be exposed regularly to the public, can assert traditional privacy rights. 159 Nor is the general issue of rights under specific privacy statutes within the scope of the present discussion. The concern here is simply over the assertion of statutory 160 or common law right of publicity claims in connection solely with the merchandising of the persona itself, as in ETW or Comedy III. If such claims are to be sustained, the rationale for doing so is inherently different from that upon which the right of publicity is based and therefore, they must be founded on something other than the right of publicity.
Realistically, in that context what is being sold is the image itself and not something else to which that image might lend value. The fact that the image is embodied tangibly in the paper of a lithograph or the fabric of a T-Shirt should no more, standing alone, implicate an association of the person depicted with the seller, than the embodiment of the AJob=s Daughters@ insignia in a signet ring implicates the trademark rights of the International Order of Job=s Daughters. 161
Conclusion: Applying Occam=s Razor To Preserve the Fundamental Balance The approach to merchandising rights with respect both to trademarks and celebrity images has been needlessly complex and demands simplification. The Supreme Court, with its strong admonition to restore and recognize the balance among the different intellectual property constructs, has provided the broad framework within which such simplification can be realized. We start by recognizing that trademark rights are essentially appurtenant, conditional rights, rather than self-sustaining property rights. That leads to the conclusion that trademark law cannot be the vehicle for enforcing claims arising out of the merchandising of the mark itself, absent clear evidence of real (rather than spurious) consumer confusion as to source, origin, or sponsorship of goods or services. 162 In the same vein, the right of publicity, if properly understood and bounded, similarly is an appurtenant right, rather than an absolute exclusionary right in a name or image; that recognition accordingly precludes a publicity claim based solely on exploitation of the image itself without association with the user of the image. A focus on the fundamental nature of the underlying legal constructs of trademark law and of the cognate right of publicity allows application of a conceptual occam=s razor, a
